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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

ROGELIO MONTES and MATEO
ARTEAGA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF YAKIMA, MICAH
CAWLEY, in his official capacity as
Mayor of Yakima, and MAUREEN
ADKISON, SARA BRISTOL,
KATHY COFFEY, RICK ENSEY,
DAVE ETTL, and BILL LOVER, in
their official capacity as members of
the Yakima City Council,

Defendants.

NO. 12-CV-3108 TOR

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY
OF STEPHAN THERNSTROM

NOTED FOR HEARING:

August 20, 2014

Without Oral Argument

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE
EXPERT TESTIMONY – 1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants bear the burden of establishing that Dr. Stephan Thernstrom's opinions are reliable and admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 702; *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.*, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Instead of attempting to meet that burden squarely, Defendants seek to avoid it by arguing that exclusion of experts in a bench trial is improper and shifting focus away from Dr. Thernstrom to Plaintiffs' experts. But the flaws in Dr. Thernstrom's testimony are manifest.

Dr. Thernstrom assessed a small body of evidence, mainly consisting of Plaintiffs' expert reports and the evidence cited therein, and from this evidence drew the legal conclusion that Plaintiffs' evidence is insufficient to support a finding that the City of Yakima's electoral system violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In reaching his conclusions Dr. Thernstrom did not employ reasoned methodology—or in fact *any* methodology. This is not “expert” testimony.

II. ARGUMENT

A. *Daubert* and Rule 702 Apply in a Bench Trial.

Defendants first argue that it is “improper” to exclude Dr. Thernstrom's testimony because the Court will hold a bench trial. Regardless of whether a court or a jury sits as a trier of fact, however, expert testimony must still satisfy Rule 702 requirements. In a bench trial, “the *Daubert* standards of relevance and reliability for scientific evidence must nevertheless be met.” *Seaboard Lumber Co. v. United States*, 308 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002); *see also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. United States*, 51 F.3d 834, 842 (9th Cir. 1995) (trial court holding a bench trial properly excluded an expert opinion pursuant to Rule 702); *Attorney Gen. of Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 565 F.3d 769, 779 (10th Cir. 2009) (“*Daubert's* standards must still be met” in a bench trial); *Schilder Dairy, LLC v. DeLaval, Inc.*,

1 CV 09-531-REB, 2011 WL 2634251 (D. Idaho July 5, 2011) (“[T]he *Daubert*
 2 standards governing admissibility of expert testimony must still be met, even
 3 during a bench trial.”).

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 6 The only case Defendants cite in support of their argument that exclusion of
 7 expert testimony in a bench trial is “generally improper,” *Mabrey v. Wizard*
 8 *Fisheries, Inc.*, No. C05-1499RSL, 2008 WL 110500 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2008),
 9 is inapposite. *Mabrey* did not, in fact, address this topic but instead considered
 10 whether Rule 703 permitted an expert whose credentials were not at issue to rely
 11 on certain facts and data culled from a non-testifying expert. *Id.* at *3.

12
 13 To be sure, because this will be a bench trial, there is no risk that a lay jury
 14 will be unduly influenced by Dr. Thernstrom’s improper opinions. But unreliable
 15 and improper opinions offered by an expert not qualified to give them have no
 16 more place in front of the Court than they do in front of a jury. It thus remains the
 17 Court’s responsibility to fulfill its “gatekeeping” function under *Daubert* to
 18 exclude unhelpful and unreliable testimony. See *Metavante Corp. v. Emigrant Sav.*
 19 *Bank*, 619 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that district court erred in failing
 20 to perform a *Daubert* analysis) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

21
 22 Simply put, the unreliability of Dr. Thernstrom’s testimony is evidenced by
 23 the plain language of his expert reports. No sound justification exists for the Court
 24 to hold the gates to this testimony wide open simply because the Court is serving
 25 as trier of fact.

26
 27 **B. Dr. Thernstrom’s Testimony Does Not Meet the Standards Set Out**
 28 **in *Daubert* and Rule 702.**

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 30 The Court should preclude Dr. Thernstrom from providing his opinions in
 31 this case pursuant to *Daubert* and Rule 702 because his opinions are based on
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1 insufficient facts and data and are not the product of reliable principles and
 2 methods. *See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner*, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (“[N]othing in
 3 either *Daubert* or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
 4 opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the *ipse dixit* of the
 5 expert.”); *see also Amorgianos v. Nat’l Railroad Passenger Corp.*, 303 F.3d 256,
 6 266-67 (2d Cir. 2002) (where “an expert opinion is based on data, a methodology,
 7 or studies that are simply inadequate to support the conclusions reached, *Daubert*
 8 and Rule 702 mandate the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony”). As the
 9 court recognized in the *Large v. Fremont County* case discussed below, and which
 10 fact Defendants do not substantively dispute, the conclusions set out in
 11 Dr. Thernstrom’s reports are not tethered to reasoned analysis, and that is because
 12 Dr. Thernstrom is not qualified to opine on the racial dynamics of a jurisdiction he
 13 knows nothing about.

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1. *Fremont County* Rejected Dr. Thernstrom’s Testimony Under Nearly Identical Circumstances.

In *Large v. Fremont County*, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1231 (D. Wyo. 2010),
 “the Court wholly reject[ed] the opinions [Dr. Thernstrom] proffered on the
 historic and present day experience of Native people and race relations in Fremont
 County, as it was apparent that Dr. Thernstrom was not only treading far outside of
 his narrow role in [the] litigation, but was also testifying about matters in which he
 had little experience or knowledge.” The same is true here.

Defendants’ attempt to distinguish *Fremont County* fails. There, as here,
 Dr. Thernstrom was retained to critique the work of one of the plaintiffs’ experts.
 There, as here, Dr. Thernstrom used that role to offer opinions he was unqualified
 to give about matters about which he knew little-to-nothing. Defendants claim

1 that, in *Fremont County*, Dr. Thernstrom did not benefit from the kind of historical
 2 evidence available to him here, including “newspaper stories, statistical data, or
 3 any other material commonly relied on in voting rights litigation.” ECF No. 72
 4 (“Response Br.”) at 8; *see also* ECF No. 73 (Declaration of Stephan A.
 5 Thernstrom (“Thernstrom Decl.”)), ¶ 3 (“In the *Fremont County* case, there were
 6 no newspaper articles and very little in the way of statistics, or other material
 7 commonly relied on in Voting Rights Act cases . . .”).¹ Even a cursory review of
 8 the court’s decision in *Fremont County* shows this to be false.
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10 In *Fremont County* there was such a “wealth of information” presented to
 11 the court that the court found it “neither necessary nor possible” to memorialize it.
 12 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1231. In addition to the opinions of Dr. Martha Hipp, which
 13 Dr. Thernstrom contends comprised most of the plaintiffs’ evidence, Thernstrom
 14 Decl. ¶ 4, the plaintiffs in *Fremont County* in fact presented the opinions of *three*
 15 additional experts, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1211-12, 1231. And these experts did not
 16 render their opinions in a vacuum. With respect to statistics, for example, the court
 17 considered and relied upon a set of “statistics demonstrating disparities between
 18 education level, home ownership, and income level.” *Id.* at 1226. The court
 19 likewise cited the plaintiffs’ expert’s “invaluable project of conducting interviews
 20 and gathering first hand information from tribal members.” *Id.* at 1231. If this
 21 were not enough, the court—and Dr. Thernstrom—had at their disposal an array of
 22 other data and information related to, for example, employment, employment
 23 history, poverty levels, and tribal self-identification. *See id.* at 1200-01& n.6.
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 45 ¹ Notably, despite Dr. Thernstrom’s disparagement of the plaintiffs’ evidence in
 46 *Fremont County*, the court in that case found a Section 2 violation.
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1 Dr. Thernstrom's claim that there was an "absence of written materials to analyze"
2 is misleading at best. Thernstrom Decl. ¶ 5.

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4 In *Fremont County* and in this case, Dr. Thernstrom sought to perform an
5 identical function: he professed opinions related to the historic and present day
6 experience of minority populations and race relations in locales in which he has no
7 direct experience and as to which he had conducted little-to-no independent
8 research. Contrary to Defendants' assertions, the court in *Fremont County* did not
9 reject Dr. Thernstrom's opinions because of any purported dearth of documentary
10 evidence. Response Br. at 8. Instead, it rejected Dr. Thernstrom's testimony² for
11 the precise reason the Court should do so here: Dr. Thernstrom presents opinions
12 regarding "matters in which he [has] little experience or knowledge" and supports
13 these opinions purely with subjective inferences regarding what he believes
14 Plaintiffs' body of evidence says. 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.

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2. Defendants Do Not Dispute that Dr. Thernstrom's Analysis Is Unreliable and Unsupported.

As Plaintiffs established in their Motion, Dr. Thernstrom's profoundly
flawed "methodology" fails to satisfy the requirements set forth in Rule 702. *See*
ECF No. 62 at 4-8. Defendants' failure to substantively address this issue should
be taken as a concession that Dr. Thernstrom's testimony, in whole or part, is
inadmissible.

Plaintiffs set forth a number of specific areas in which Dr. Thernstrom's
testimony is unreliable and unsupported. *See id.* These include the fact that Dr.
Thernstrom (1) fails to provide an evidentiary basis for many assertions, such as,

² It does not appear that the plaintiffs in *Fremont County* formally moved to
exclude Dr. Thernstrom's testimony under *Daubert* and Rule 702.

1 for example, those related to the desirability of at-large elections, (2) repeatedly
 2 opines on Plaintiffs' experts' conclusions and beliefs without any basis in the
 3 historical record or the actual language of their reports, and (3) makes factual
 4 assertions that have no basis in the historical record or *in fact*. *Id.*

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 6 Defendants do not respond substantively to this, the heart of Plaintiffs'
 7 Motion, contending that the page limit allotted for their response bars any such
 8 "point-by-point" response. *See* Response Br. at 9. Instead, Defendants baldly
 9 characterize the many instances in which Dr. Thernstrom's analysis is unsupported
 10 or flat wrong as "small oversights or inaccuracies" and ask the Court to "assess the
 11 merits of [Plaintiffs'] criticisms by relying on trial testimony." *Id.* But
 12 Dr. Thernstrom's opinions will be no more admissible once they appear in the
 13 form of trial testimony as they are in his reports. Defendants' failure to dispute the
 14 fundamental failures in reasoning and foundation that render Dr. Thernstrom's
 15 testimony unreliable and valueless to the Court implicitly concedes the merits of
 16 this motion. *See Selliken v. Country Mut. Ins. Co.*, 12-CV-0515-TOR, 2013 WL
 17 4759083, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2013) (holding that opposing party
 18 "effectively concede[s]" issue by failing to respond to moving party's argument).
 19 Even for this reason standing alone, the Court should bar Dr. Thernstrom's
 20 testimony, or at least the specific aspects of his testimony identified in Plaintiffs'
 21 Motion as representing nothing other than unsupported conjecture.

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 23 In this regard, it is entirely telling that Defendants spend more time attacking
 24 Plaintiffs' experts than they do attempting to defend Dr. Thernstrom's actual
 25 testimony. *See* Response Br. at 1-3, 7, 9. This is all a red herring. Plaintiffs'
 26 experts are not at issue in this Motion. Instead, where a party objects to the
 27 admission of an expert witness's opinion and adequately explains why the opinion

1 is unreliable, the “proponent of the opinion has the burden of establishing the
 2 ultimate fact of reliability” of that expert’s testimony by a preponderance of the
 3 evidence. *U.S. v. Frazier*, 387 F.3d 1244, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing *Daubert*,
 4 509 U.S. at 593 n. 10). Defendants’ criticism of Plaintiffs’ experts has *no bearing*
 5 upon this issue. Defendants chose not to file an independent motion to exclude
 6 directed toward Plaintiffs’ experts. They are free to cross-examine Plaintiffs’
 7 experts at trial, but they cannot salvage Dr. Thernstrom’s testimony by critiquing
 8 Plaintiffs’ experts.³ Because Defendants have not satisfied their burden to show
 9 the opinions of Dr. Thernstrom are reliable, his testimony must be excluded.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony
 of Dr. Thernstrom should be granted.

³ Given that Defendants’ discussion of Plaintiffs’ experts is immaterial to this
 Motion, Plaintiffs will not respond in detail here. Suffice to say, that discussion is
 in many ways inaccurate. For example, Defendants claim that “Dr. Fraga, has not
 conducted any research specifically into the City other than interviewing ten
 people chosen by the ACLU and driving around the City for a few hours.”
 Response Br. at 7. To the contrary, in addition to visiting Yakima and meeting
 with Yakima residents (unlike Dr. Thernstrom), as Dr. Fraga’s report shows, he
 conducted significant research into the City, including consideration of primary
 and secondary sources such as academic articles and books, documents produced
 in discovery, newspaper articles, letters to the editor, demographic data, and
 lawsuits against the City and County of Yakima. *See generally* ECF No. 74-2.

1 DATED: July 22, 2014

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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on July 22, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the following attorney(s) of record:

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I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

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